“We will march as many times as necessary”: Why Peru’s Gen Z is Rising Against a Failed State
- Ella Leffler
- 56 minutes ago
- 14 min read
On September 9, 2025, Nepalese youth protestors successfully overthrew their government following decades of corruption plaguing their country and exploiting state resources and their people. This historical moment inspired youth-based Gen Z uprisings in countries facing similar yet different states of leadership nepotism, widening social and economic inequality and political corruption. Those countries include Morocco, Peru, Indonesia, Kenya, the Philippines and Madagascar, which also successfully ousted former President Andry Rajoelina. These Gen-led protests are one of a kind. This generation is the first ever to fully grow up with the internet, being able to observe other parts of the world easily for most of their lives. They have strategically utilized the internet to create a digital community in their shared grievances that their respective political institutions do not serve their concerns, and have drawn inspiration on those communities to mobilize.
“This is a dictatorship disguised as a democracy…People’s lives are a joke to those in power” – Jorge Calmet, Peruvian Gen Z protestor
“We have grown up in a country where corruption has been normalised…We young people want a modern Peru; we want a country where we can live and not have to emigrate in search of a better quality of life.” –Milagros Rojas, Peruvian Gen Z protector
These powerful remarks from protestors encapsulate the frustration and aims behind the Gen Z anti-corruption protests in Peru. In the Peruvian case, protestors took to the streets on September 13, 2025, in opposition to the passage of Pension law that required young people to contribute to private pension funds. Peru, however, suffers from high rates of job insecurity with a 70% informal job sector– one of the highest in South America. The younger generation already feels cheated by poorly funded public education, limited formal job opportunities and corrupt politicians who profit from the exploitation of their people. Thus, the pension fund issue unveiled these other frustrations amongst Peruvian protestors, unleashing their disdain for a system that has failed them time and time again.
The protests began under the famously disliked President, Dina Boluarte, who was ousted by Congress following a shooting at a concert in Lima. The governing body had reached its limits with her and the claimed poor handling of crime rates and ousted her on the claim of “moral incapacity” instating the current president, Jose Jeri– a man with rape allegations against him. The protests continued under the beginning days of his presidency, but quickly came to a halt with Jerí declaring a State of Emergency for Lima and Callao. For now demonstrations are off limits in the country’s capital, underscoring the government’s reliance on force over dialogue to address people's concerns.
A Brief History of Corruption in Contemporary Peru
Peru ranks highest in citizen dissatisfaction rates concerning the country’s government institutions and democracy out of all Latin American countries. This is largely in part to the sustainment of colonial institutions. Prior to Peruvian independence from colonial powers, state institutions and colonial elites were centered on the coast in Lima from where Indigenous communities in the Andean mountain and jungle regions were exploited and subordinated. When Peru became an independent republic, rather than forming a state representative of all Peruvians, the centralization in Lima, with Creole elite rulers continued. As Peru entered the global market, maintaining indigenous peoples' oppression became of interest beyond racist colonial discourse that never left the country. The rich resources of the mountainous and jungle regions, which Lima could exploit and profit from became a priority. It became an incentive, stemming from colonial legacy, to maintain indigenous peoples in a state of poverty, exclusion, and violence so as to benefit the elites centered in Lima.
This historical context is important to understanding Peru’s corrupt politicians today. The entire history of the modern republic is built on the suppression of indigenous communities to extract and abuse their resource rich land. Today politicians prioritize the interests of powerful business elites and foreign investors over the well-being of the public, repeating long-standing patterns of exclusion, racism, and resource exploitation that have shaped Peruvian politics since independence.
By the time former dictator Alberto Fujimori was on the election ballot he secured the presidency by running on anti-establishment sentiments that resonated with people who were tired of disorganized politics. In his first two years Fujimori violently did away with the Shining Path guerilla and Tupac Amaru movements. Fujimori is known to have committed a slew of extrajudicial killings, by strategic use of the military. Through the neo-liberal ‘Fuji shock,’ the increase of gas prices by 3,000 percent, he stabilized the economy and reduced inflation, but disadvantaged much of the average Peruvians. These authoritarian moves concentrated his power in the executive branch and after two years in the presidency, he assumed full judicial and legislative powers through a self-coup, disintegrating Congress. He established a new constitution in 1993, which still stands today as the country's ruling document and is to blame for the unstable and corrupt nature of Peru’s government. He presided over the 1995 elections, securing the presidency again by a wide margin forcing Peru’s traditional parties to lose their registration. The remainder of his rule consisted of a wide variety of human rights abuses, including the forced sterilization of indigenous women.. He also ruled with weak political institutions, easily bent to his will; corruption and 2000 election fraud. Amid evidence of corruption Fujimori resigned, marking an end of his regime and the country's second transition to democracy.
The legacy of Fujimori brought forth perpetual political crises into the country. In his 1993 constitution many important factors still enable this. Corrupt politicians who prioritize the bribes of private companies over their people's well-being, enable persistent inequalities across the country. In addition, the thinly defined “Moral Incapacity” clause gives congress the power to easily oust the president.
All of Peru’s Presidents since the transition to democracy have been accused of corruption. The most known case, in which all prior Peruvian presidents were implicated was that of Odebrecht. From 2000-2014 the company, throughout Latin America, secured infrastructure concessions guaranteeing long-term profit by paying off countries' leaders for profitable contract terms or projects. Nearly all Peruvian presidents were implicated. Alejandro Toledo, (2001-2006) received $35 million in bribes from the company in exchange for granting the company a favourable contract constructing the Interoceanic Highway connecting Peru and Brazil. Ollanta Humala, (2011-2016) accepted $3 million in campaign funds in exchange for supporting the Gasoducto Sur gas-pipeline project the company was pursuing. He also received funds from then-Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013). Humala, his wife and brother have all been imprisoned for money laundering due to both of these instances. Alan García, (2006-2011) received $200,000 in campaign funds through Odebrecht’s secret, illegal offshore accounts and $1.3 million through intermediaries. Garcia’s case has not been definitively confirmed in court as he died by suicide following corruption allegations. It's largely believed that public contracts for Odebrecht's construction of the Lima Metro were secured through some of these bribes. Pedro Pablo Kucynski, (2016-2018) accepted funds directed to his companies First Capital and West Capital, as well as $300,000 in campaign funds in exchange for political support in infrastructure plans. Keiko Fujimori, daughter of the former dictator, received millions of dollars in campaign funds in her various unsuccessful attempts to gain the presidency back for her family name. She also was accused of using Odebrecht funds to coordinate and lead a criminal organization.
The general fallout of years of Odebrecht corruption was the well-being of the Peruvian public. Bribing politicians enabled the company to find themselves in a power position and demand large allotments of money. For example, the construction of the Southern Interoceanic Highway was renegotiated from $263 million to $654 million. In total around $1.9 billion was expended on Odebrecht. That is billions of dollars that could have been invested in the Peruvian people, who in the wake of these corruption scandals, became more disillusioned knowing the government elites prioritized their own monetary benefits over addressing numerous other inequalities in the country. Disillusionment also held root in the fact that corruption was the standard in Peruvian politics, not the exception. Many of these former presidents and those that succeeded them have numerous corruption charges.
Fujimori’s constitution, which established the “Permanent Moral Incapacity” clause, states that Congress can oust a President if and when they deem them to be morally or physically incapacitated. The broadly defined Moral Incapacity has further destabilized Peruvian politics in recent years, affording Congress a near unchecked power to oust presidents who have been deemed by them as dangerous. Martin Vizcara, (2018-2020) was the first president since Fujimori to be ousted on this clause after a second attempt to impeach him. Vizcara, was very popular with the Peruvian people, running on an anti corruption campaign and willing to challenge the right-wing Congress. He was impeached on reports that he received about $640,000 in bribes in 2011-2014 as regional governor. Critics and supporters however, were skeptical of this ruling, citing Congress’s known dislike of him due to his anti-Corruption campaign and willingness to dissolve, positioning himself as a threat to corrupt right-leaning or business-aligned parties. Congress swiftly removed him after the corruption allegations were uncovered, despite Vizcarra denying them, replacing him with the chair of Congress Manuel Merino. Multiple international bodies found this to be an overstep of power, condemning the moral incapacity's weak definition for affording too much unchecked power.
In response, Peruvians around the country took to the streets, opposing the undemocratic impeachment of Vizcara–fueled by years of rage at corrupt Peruvian politics. Protests ran for a week, demanding new elections and Merino’s stepping down to fill the democratic gap Congress had made in removing the democratically elected leader. After two protestors were killed by police, Merino stepped down and new election cycles began.
Pedro Castillo: Setting the Stage for Now
Pedro Castillo came into power in 2021, following an impressive campaign running on an agenda seeking to dissolve the “right-wing coup Congress,” nationalize and industrialize minerals, and to write a new constitution. A former school teacher from a rural province area, he drew in much of the majority indigenous areas of Cusco, Puno, Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica. From the onset, running on a primarily leftist campaign in the Peru Libre party, opposition-Congress opposed his campaign and tried to prevent him from ascending to the presidency. Even after Keiko Fujimori, his opposition refused to accept her loss, Castillo ascended to the presidency.
His time in the presidency was marked by instability, following years of fast presidential turnover the norm for most Peruvian presidents. While at the tail end of his administration Castillo did successfully claim credit for a 3.5% growth of the Peruvian economy and was able to collect outstanding tax debts from larger companies. Congress’s dislike and unwillingness to cooperate with him prevented much of Castillo’s desire to push the reforms he ran on and created an unstable relationship. This included three impeachment attempts, fulfilling the threat Congress had made before he was instated. Prior to the third attempt, Castillo tried to make due on one of his campaign promises - dissolving Congress and approving a new constitution. Hours after calling for the dissolution of Congress to fulfill plans of holding elections to instate a new Congressional body, Castillo was arrested and subsequently impeached. The same fate as Vizcara, Castillo’s impeachment also produced major protests throughout the country.
2022 Repression
In Castillo’s place Congress instated his former Vice President, Dina Boluarte. Protests spread throughout the country, fueled by the feeling that they would never have a proper voice under the current political regime. People of indigenous and rural backgrounds led these nation-wide protests, demanding an end to their historical oppression. Frustration resided in the destruction of natural resources in indigenous lands that has only increased over the last 30 years, as well as the rise of an oligarchical Congress abusing their powers and the exploitation of workers in informal job positions. Nationwide, however, protestors requested Boluarte’s resignation, early elections, closing the coup-Congress and a new constitution.
Boluarte aligned with Fujimorism and other right-wing parties and refused to step down, or fulfill any of the protestors' demands. Instead she declared a state of emergency and ordered a violent and deathly crackdown on protestors in Arequipa, Cusco, Andahuaylas and Ayacucho with almost every protest seeing deaths at the hands of police. Most deadly was the Juliaca massacre in Puno, when police opened fire on predominantly indigenous, protestors killing 18 people and injuring 100. “How many more deaths do you want,” Boluarte once said, refusing to resign.. She denounced protestors as terrorists colluding with foreign forces. No evidence was provided to back these claims, a classic authoritarian tactic to justify the kinds of human rights abuses she oversaw. Protests lessened by March of 2023 once it was evident that nothing was going to change.
It is not accidental, many people have noted, that such violent repression was concentrated in the south of the country– the lithium rich, mining concentrated areas. In May of 2023, Peru’s Minister of Energy and Mines announced they would be privatizing its lithium resources. Having sold mining rights to Canadian Lithium, a mining company which is owned by American Lithium, which operates multiple mining operations in the country. Many see the violent repression and the impeachment plus arrest of Castillo, who wanted to nationalize lithium resources, as a tactical move to repress inhabitants of the exploited regions for economic profit. Investigations into claims of genocide are being carried out against Boluarte regarding her actions.
Following the repression Boluarte characterized herself as a “woman of peace, open to dialogue, a conciliator who believes in democracy,” thereby categorically erasing the authoritative violence she approved. Throughout her time as president, Boluarte was deeply unpopular with the country maintaining at one point a 1% approval rating. Her presidency was categorized by corruption allegations, regarding her 2021 political campaign and bribery with expensive Rolex watches from a governor, for which she narrowly avoided an impeachment effort. Additionally, she was largely criticized for her poor handling of crime. Extortion rates rose by 370% while non-extortion homicide rates increased by 20%. All of these factors compounded and following a shooting at a concert in Lima, Congress struck with the moral incapacity clause for the third time in the last five years. Dina Boluarte was swiftly impeached on the morning of October 10, 2025. In her place, came Jose Jerí, the former leader of Congress who has corruption and sexual assault allegations against him.
While Boluarte was disliked, this move only compounded the frustration of protests in Lima’s historical center. Gen Z encompasses all people born after 1996, which in Peru means they are the Post-Fujimori generation. The Peruvian political landscape throughout their life has been characterised by incompetent presidents who prioritize corruption over their people. When the Pension fund was announced, the youth took the lead in planning and attending demonstrations. The protestors have taken on a more decentralized mode of gathering. It is not one definable movement with leaders, but rather individuals following and using hashtags like #GenZ, #corupción, and #ProtestasPeru, to encourage other youths to participate.
“We are organizing ourselves better, creating alliances, and gradually bringing more people on board. With the little experience we have, we are achieving a lot.” –Protestor
The initial discontent with the pension fund brought to light many issues which mirror the demands of the 2022 protests. Elections are slated to take place in April 2026. Many fear that Congress and their new president–who shares their ideological affiliation–will try to capitalize on current instability and instate him as permanent president. This would rob civilians of their democratic election processes and entrench the right-wing Congress’s powers. For these reasons, a central demand is Jeri’s resignation and replacement with an independent congress member until the April elections. Other demands include: the persecution of politicians involved in approving the violence of the 2022 protests; stronger civilian power in the decisions of the country; more economic certainty and formal job opportunity; and a new constitution to end the exploitation of the country’s people and to shrink deepened inequalities.
“What I saw made me feel sick. The police show no mercy. They shoot you because they shoot you. If there’s a child there, they don’t care. If there’s an elderly person there, they don’t care” –Gen Z protestor on police force
Police response has been acutely violent; mirroring a historical pattern of the Peruvian State’s attitude towards demonstrations. Throughout the wave of protests in Lima saw much use of rubber bullets, tear gas fired at close range and unlawful arrests of non-violent protestors. This amounted to a total of 102 injured and one death, rapper Eduardo Ruiz, who was shot by a police officer dressed in civilian clothing. As a response, Jeri refused to resign, and instead of addressing any protestor demands he instated a 30-day state of emergency for Lima and Callao on October 22. The declaration includes the increased deployment of police officers on Lima streets to pacify demonstrations and a curfew. Additionally, police–with the support of armed forces– are called on to “confront crime and other situations of violence” including to suppress demonstrations. Jeri paired this with a video announcement to the public where he announced a war on crime:
“Crime has increased disproportionately in recent years, causing immense pain to thousands of families and further hindering the country’s progress. But that’s over. Today, we begin to change the narrative of insecurity in Peru…Wars are won with actions, not words” – Jerí announcing state of emergency
Interestingly enough the stated goal of reducing crime is one which is shared by the protestors. The difference lies in how two groups categorize the crimes. Past states of emergency, a common tactic of the Peruvian state, have cited organized crime. While Jeri did cite the “wave of violence and extortion attributed to organized crime;” similar to the protestors and most of the population. 59% of Peruvians see crime and insecurity as the biggest problems in the country. Protestors however, claim that increased violence and extortion of bus drivers by mafia groups–who have killed 108 drivers this year– is enabled by laws passed by the current Congress.
In December 2023, Congress altered the Efficient Collaboration Law, a corruption investigative tool, shortening the time prosecutors have to corroborate statements of those involved–making it harder to investigate corruption cases. Overall in 2024, Congress made a concerted effort in weakening the body in charge of appointing and removing judges, prosecutors, and electoral authorities–The National Board of Justice–an important check on Peru’s separation of powers. In September 2024, Congress approved a bill appointing the police in charge of criminal investigations. This move destabilized and weakened the Attorney General’s Office, which had previously been in charge, and it undermined efficiency. July 2024 saw Congress narrowing the definition of “organized crime,” weakening prosecutors' abilities to look into corruption and extortion which are closely linked to organized crime groups. Many Congress members are currently, or have been under investigation, for their involvement in corruption and collusion with organized crime groups. It is in the interest of the corrupt Congress to allow organized crime and extortion rates to go up as it draws away attention from its own illegal acts and allows them to continue committing corrupt acts. The repression Congress perpetrates is also mirrored in a sense by organized crime groups who distill fear in Peruvian society, keeping civilians in a more pacified and fearful state.
These laws reveal who Jeri is really targeting when he says, “War on Crime”: protestors. The state of emergency coupled with the laws is telling enough. However, what really solidifies this is the way in which his prime minister talks about youth protestors. Ernesto Álvarez Miranda, a man with six corruption and defamation allegations against him berated Gen Z protestors on social media. “Heir to the MRTA, the gang that wants to seize democracy to control the April elections does not represent the youth who study and work for a future.” The MRTA or Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement was a socialist revolutionary movement that wanted to upend the politically corrupt state, reduce inequality and do away with U.S. influence. While the similarities between the MRTA and gen z protestors are very present, the MRTA was designated a terrorist organization for its more consistent use of violence to try and liberate the country. Álvarez’s analogy functions mainly as a political tool, framing civic unrest as terrorism to delegitimize a generation demanding accountability. It reflects the personal attitude the people in Congress and Jerí’s government hold for youth protestors. Jeri and his government define opposing protestors as criminals so as to protect him and the right wing Congress’s interests.
As the State of Emergency came to a close in November Jeri announced its extension citing the pursuit of dropping crime rates, masking the intention to extend control of the Peruvian people.
Laws premissing organized crimes with the increasing grab on power by the right-wing Congress in the past couple of years, the targeted suppression of protestors demands for a new constitution, and Jeri’s state of emergency reveal the corrupt, almost authoritarian, nature of Peruvian political institutions. Peru’s Gen Z movement stands as a clear testament to a society that has reached its limit. Following years of corruption scandals, manipulated institutions, and deadly repression, young Peruvians are refusing to accept a political order built on their exclusion. Their mobilization signifies a generation no longer willing to wait for reform from above. Instead, they are asserting their right to shape Peru’s future on their own terms.
