Report on Hybrid Threats & Disinformation ahead of the Armenian Elections and the Role of Civil Society

On April 21, 2026, the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum opened a discussion on “Hybrid Threats and Disinformation: The Role of Civil Society in the Armenian Elections” in Brussels. The conference gathered European Union policymakers on one side, represented by MEP Miriam Lexmann, MEP Andrey Kovatchev, and Jan Latal from European Union External Action Services; on the other side civil society representatives, including Lousineh Hakobyan from the NGO Europe in Law Association, Daniel Ioannisyan from Union of Informed Citizens and Hovsep Khurshudyan from EaP CSF; and finally, the researcher in diplomacy and international affairs Dorina Baltag. Together they assessed how disinformation, cyber threats, and foreign interference are shaping Armenia’s electoral environment, and how civil society actors can respond. This panel discussion took place ahead of the upcoming Armenian parliamentary elections, a vote considered crucial from a national and geopolitical perspective in the context of rivalry between the European Union and Russia. 

Hybrid threats are defined as coordinated and deliberate actions carried out by state or non-state actors. These actions combine various tools, such as disinformation, cyberattacks, political pressure, or economic coercion, to undermine a country's democratic institutions and processes, such as especially during electoral periods, often without triggering open conflict. These strategies are designed to be difficult to detect and to erode trust gradually, rather than through direct confrontation.

More specifically, disinformation refers to the intentional dissemination of false or misleading information aimed at manipulating public opinion, distorting political debate, and weakening democratic decision-making. Within hybrid campaigns, disinformation is a central instrument, often deployed via digital platforms such as social media, and amplified by coordinated networks to sow division and confusion.

With the elections scheduled for 7 June 2026, the discussion unfolded against the backdrop of growing concern that Armenia, described by MEP Miriam Lexmann as a democratic “last shining star” in the South Caucasus, is approaching a decisive moment. As participants stressed throughout the conference, the elections are not only a domestic political contest but also a test of resilience in the face of foreign interference, particularly from Russia. 

A Fragile Democratic Balance 

In opening the debate, MEP Miriam Lexmann presented Armenia as a country that is both hopeful and vulnerable. She emphasized that European Union-Armenia relations are currently closer than ever. She also greeted the country moving towards deeper cooperation and even approaching a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, illustrated by the reopening of borders. 

However, hybrid threats are intensifying in the run-up to the elections, a trend confirmed by intelligence assessments that predict such activities will likely become “more widespread and on a larger scale” in 2026, MEP Lexmann claimed. 

Russia & the Geopolitics of Interference 

The more geopolitical dimension of this conference was brought  by MEP Andrey Kovatchev, who warned against Russia's sustained efforts to influence the national policies of its neighboring states, not only  Armenia’s, but also in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and even within the European Union. 

According to Kovatchev, Russia's strategy relies primarily on the manipulation of historical narratives, particularly those surrounding national identity and the outcomes of historical conflicts, such as the war with the Ottoman Empire. Russian intelligence services then pursue this strategy by instrumentalizing the national religious sphere. In concrete terms, this involves promoting selective or revisionist interpretations of history, for example, narratives presenting Russia as a historical “liberator” of Slavic or Orthodox populations, while portraying Western actors as hostile or destabilizing. These narratives are widely used in the Central and Eastern European Union to fuel pro-Russian sentiment and distrust of the European Union.

Finally, Russia asserts its rights over neighboring states, which it considers within its sphere of influence, and which it seeks to make hostile towards external powers such as the European Union in commercial, political, and military terms. 

Kovatchev explained that evidence suggests Russian-linked networks are already active in Armenia, where they are deploying disinformation campaigns similar to those seen in Moldova, using fake civil societies or wealthy businesses. 

All panelists also expressed concern about the scale and persistence of these efforts, mentioning ongoing intelligence operations aimed at shaping Armenian public opinion. 

An Electoral Weapon: Disinformation 

The most detailed account of the threats to the elections comes from Armenian civil society actors themselves. Lousineh Hakobyan described an extremely fragmented political landscape, where forces ranging from pro-European Union to pro-Russian are clashing. According to her, pro-Russian parties are actively using disinformation to bring Armenia back into Moscow's orbit. These pro-Russian supporters portray Armenia as a non-democracy, overly dependent on Russian economic power, and incapable of ensuring its internal security. 

Daniel Ioannisyan went further, identifying Russian interference as the main threat to the elections. Among the practices he has observed, he mentioned social pressure on companies starting out in Russia, which are forced to compel their employees to vote for pro-Russian parties. They also denounce the manipulation of national economic and trade data to discredit Armenia's commercial power. Furthermore, disinformation on national security, including claims that Armenia is dangerous, even in its capital, Yerevan, is compounded by anti-peace rhetoric aimed at undermining reconciliation with Azerbaijan. 

It is worth recalling that this reconciliation process is particularly delicate given the legacy of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which lasted for decades between Armenia and Azerbaijan and shaped the political identity of both countries since the early 1990s. The latest escalation, in 2023, allowed Azerbaijan to regain full control of the region and resulted in the mass displacement of approximately 100,000 Armenians, adding to a long history of war, trauma, and unresolved grievances.

Although negotiations have recently progressed toward a peace agreement, the lack of reconciliation at the societal level, coupled with conflicting historical narratives and deep mistrust, continues to undermine the process. In this context, disinformation campaigns that promote anti-peace rhetoric or revive fears of a resumption of the conflict can directly jeopardize ongoing diplomatic efforts and destabilize the region.

A Polarized Society 

The polarization of Armenian society was a recurring theme at the conference. The panelists emphasized that disinformation is effective not only because of external actors, but also because of internal vulnerabilities. They cited a lack of trust in national institutions, the polarization of the media landscape, and the limited capacity of civil society to counter disinformation. 

Ioannisyan noted that even basic data, such as participation in protests, can be distorted, while independent media outlets struggle to find funding, unlike social media disinformation networks that are well-funded by pro-Russian groups. Indeed the possibility of demonstrating, along with voting, is one of the most popular means of citizen expression, which is why the number of participants varies according to the political opinion of those who report on them.

Meanwhile, pro-Russian rhetoric is increasingly becoming integrated into everyday discourse, echoing trends observed in Moldova, where disinformation extends beyond politics to affect areas such as health and consumer information in supermarkets, as Dorina Baltag described.

Armenian Civil Society: Strong but Under Pressure 

Despite these challenges, Armenian civil society remains a key player. Hakobyan emphasized that civil society has always been strong, but that it now faces limited resources and increasing pressure from hybrid threats. 

The initiatives of civil society actors in Armenia are diverse, ranging from election monitoring and combating disinformation to organizing support for democratic participation and building trust between Armenian citizens and their government. 

However, the discussion also revealed a more complex reality. Some organizations labeled as "civil society" can themselves contribute to disinformation, raising questions about their credibility and oversight. 

The European Union continues to support Armenian civil society through funding mechanisms specifically designed to strengthen its institutional and societal resilience. 

Indeed, the European Union has already deployed a hybrid rapid response team to support Armenian authorities, and has also distributed around €12 million in financial support to strengthen mechanisms against online disinformation. Finally, a broader civilian mission focused on long-term resilience against hybrid threats has also been planned. 

Lessons from Moldova 

Drawing parallels with Moldova, Baltag emphasized that disinformation thrives where the ground is fertile, namely where trust in institutions is already fragile. Her main message was that resilience alone is not enough. Democratic systems must be strengthened, which requires collaboration among multi-layered stakeholders. This means a reinforced and supported commitment from citizens, amplified by the diaspora, and relayed by the media and within businesses that enable economic development. This multi-stakeholder approach was presented as essential to restoring democratic credibility. 

Jan Latal supported this point, stressing the need to restore trust in democratic processes and European Union integration. 

Key Takeaways

Three main takeaways from the conference Hybrid Threats and Disinformation – The Role of Civil Society in Armenia’s Elections can be noted. First, that hybrid threats are systemic and intensifying, particularly as elections approach. Second, that civil society is essential but underfunded and increasingly targeted. And finally, the elections constitute a test for a democratic system that is gradually reforming. The outcome will demonstrate the capacity of Armenian society to resist sustained hybrid pressure from Russia while continuing its path toward the European Union.