Who's the Victim Here?

A Comment on the Cynical Welfare Debate in Germany

There are few better media attention triggers than the image of the "lazy immigrant." Discourse on foreigners who do not contribute to public funds, but drain countries' tax-financed welfare system enrages tax payers and does well in big letters. Fairly so, in times of aging populations, national social assistance schemes carry the twofold burden of even more pensioners and a shrinking working age demographic. Any public cent spent is scrutinized through this double lens. 

Voilà, a short resume of a debate that is currently rocking through German media and politics.

On October 27, German Labor Minister Bärbel Bas and regional governments held a conference titled "Problems and Solutions in Connection with Immigration from EU Countries”.

Their conclusion? EU welfare abusers shall be returned to their home countries and may not be allowed back. To better their detection, welfare and labor agencies will improve their coordination and communication. A more efficient fight against organized abuse was announced as well. 

The "foreigners" in question, allegedly draining the German welfare state, are EU-citizens and mostly come from South eastern member states like Romania or Bulgaria. As a reminder, within the EU legal framework, EU citizens are generally free to reside, work and enjoy non-discriminatory treatment along with nationals in accessing employment and social benefits, in all 27 member states.

This pillar of the EU´s internal market has internationalized European labor relations as no measure ever before; within the decade between 2014 and 2024, foreign employment in the German labor market has more than doubled (2,9 million to 6 million); the biggest growth recorded for Eastern European migrant workers. In 2025, the German labor market counted 578,000 Romanians and 200,000 Bulgarians in employment. Western Balkan nationals account for another 600,000 foreign workers. 

And this is not enough, numbers from the "Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung" (IAB) warrant a yearly inflow of around 400,000 migrant workers to cover the pejorative effects that the German demographic change has both on the labor market, and consequently, on public finances.

Of course, this unprecedented labor influx does not go without turbulence. A particular phenomenon has been a perceived "social assistance fraud” by these newly arriving workers, made possible by lax German legislation on that matter. After an initial three-month period, mobile EU citizens in employment can claim social assistance as supplements if their income falls below a threshold defined in legislation. The possibility of stocking up financial resources via public support is intended to ensure a constitutionally guaranteed “life in dignity” but also opens doors to free drivers and criminals, seeking to abuse both the newly arrived Union citizen and the welfare state.

In 2023, the federal government counted 229 cases of organized welfare fraud, in 2024, numbers doubled to 421. With rising tendency, police forces and agencies detected another 225 cases until May 2025 alone. Financial damages both from individual and organized fraud cases amounted to 272 million EUR in 2022; with doubling numbers each year and numerous cases going unregistered, actual figures are presumed to be much higher. 

Before Minister Bas, other prominent political voices were enraged by these numbers, too. What is unfortunate is a tendency to oversimplify things, "Many Bulgarians, Romanians come here ... and plunder our welfare state", to cite Paul Ziemiak, member of parliament for the centre-right CDU. This rhetoric will remind some of Nigel Farage´s “taking back control of our borders” rhetoric during the Brexit campaign, which essentially attacked  EU internal migration and ultimately culminated in a 4 % GDP drop for the UK. 

Deputy Ziemiak´s quote does not only invoke bitter memories for Europeans, his and Minister Bas´ thoughts also fall short of a well-worked approach. Their arguments are directed ad hominem at the individual welfare abuser. This argumentation fits into the narrow attention windows of talk shows or press conferences, and is convenient if the political will to fight root causes of a problem is non-existent. This argumentation, too, carries the not so hidden risk of stigmatization. 

Their rhetoric blurs lines between individual and organized fraud cases. It leaves out, too, that around 69 % of Romanians and Bulgarians are indeed employed and do not receive any kind of social assistance, around the same percentage as for native Germans. And that, of all suspected welfare state abusers, ⅔ hold a German passport, only 5,6 % are Romanians or Bulgarians. Interestingly, it also leaves out the responsibility the state itself carries for the creation of the bespoken problem.  

Fraud schemes, both in individual and organized cases, follow similar models of taking up marginal or fixed term employment that doesn’t suffice to guarantee the constitutionally fixed “life in dignity,” especially if an entire family depends on one workers marginal income. Research has shown that these marginal employments are found in a handful of industries; fixed term employment, subcontractors, 0-hour jobs dominate in the meat and construction industry as well as in industrial cleaning. 

These industries, that more than any other rely on the influx of mobile EU citizens, are left strikingly unregulated by German legislation, resulting in opaque labor conditions. Similar “disguised employment” took place in pre-Brexit UK and fuelled separation between mobile EU citizens and Britons, resulting in hateful rhetoric.

Beneficiaries of this legal void created by German legislation are shady employers, circumventing extra payments, but also the state itself; agencies are, de facto, turning a blind eye towards these employers. The German state depends on this work force. What fills this state-made legal void is an economic eco-system playing and setting its own rules, which has permeable walls for criminals, using EU freedoms to turn this legal void into their own benefit. 

If fraud exists, this is a by-product of this blind eye and this apparently tolerated black market that non-existent legislation creates and which benefits the state. A discourse centered on social assistance cuts is inadequate and indirectly prioritizes these marginal losses for public finances over the much higher moral of building an aging economy on unfulfilled promises made to foreign workers, workers whose fundamental legal status is that of an EU citizen, and who should be on equal footing with natives regarding working conditions. 

German politicians do not seem to care, however, when this fraud debate surfaces, it is much easier to point with their fingers on a few hundred cases than fixing what is wrong: legislation that is not apt to EU freedom of movement and builds on exploiting fellow Union citizens.