Weaponization of Outer Space: Global Security Imperative
- Emma Larrue & Zeteny Jakab
- May 29
- 4 min read
Since the development of space exploration in the mid- 20th century, the prospect of space weaponization has raised concerns among the international community at large. Particularly, since the Space Race between the United States and the Soviet Union, the possibility of space-related conflict has been posing a threat to global security.
A landmark treaty, the basis of deterrence of outer space conflict, was concluded in 1966 by the United Nations Subcommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The aptly named Outer Space Treaty (OST) forbade states from placing nuclear arms or weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) on celestial objects or use space “as subject to national appropriation”. While the treaty enjoys the participation of the most capable and powerful players of the global community, such as the US, Russia or China, it specifically does not regulate the development and deployment of other types of space arms, including ballistic missiles.
With technological advancements, the definition of space militarisation has become increasingly blurry. For instance, the establishment of communication systems, such as satellites used for Global Positioning Systems (GPS), could be recognised as tools of space militarisation, as they are used to carry out military operations terrestrially. This imposes a challenge on the degree to which treaties can regulate which technologies can veritably constitute a threat of militarisation. Consequently, legal arrangements have to account for secondary or indirect weaponization of space as well. For example, extensive weapons testing, such as the launching of ballistic missiles, can have collateral effects on space safety too: specifically, space debris emitted into space during the launch can damage spacecraft and impose risks on astronauts in space. There is a consensus among states that accumulated space debris not only leads to unsatisfactory conditions for space usage, but can also result in inter-state conflicts.
Resolution 2777 (XXVI) of the General Assembly, otherwise called the Liability Convention, arranges the liability of state actors regarding damage caused in space. It expands on the obligations set out by the Outer Space Treaty (OST) and has allowed for ratifying states to settle disputes. However, its implementation has been limited in scope with only one claim filed since its creation in 1972. The claim concerned the Kosmos 954, a reconnaissance satellite launched by the Soviet Union in 1977. Due to a malfunction, nuclear waste from the satellite re-entered into the Earth’s atmosphere over Canada, which prompted the Canadian state to claim compensation for 6 million Canadian dollars, under the Liability Convention. However, the Soviet Union ended up paying half of the sum, amongst geopolitical tensions. Despite that, the agreement has served as an insurance policy to arrange disputes within a legal framework, instead of instigating interstate conflicts, even in precarious situations.
Nevertheless, in recent years, new technologies have increasingly raised concerns among states about space safety. This mainly relates to anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and a creeping risk of a space arms race. In November 2021, a Russian ASAT emitted debris that could potentially endanger the integrity of other orbiting satellites, as well as the International Space Station (ISS). As a result, many states, including the US and Australia, have called for the suspension of the deployment of these technologies. Furthermore, terrestrial interventions called spoofing, whereby warships emit signals to disturb GPS communications, have raised alarms, particularly since the Chinese navy were suspected to have tampered with navigation satellites in 2023. This has prompted several states such as the US and Japan to draft a Security Council Resolution, to reel in potentially rogue states from instigating a space arms race. Nevertheless, the resolution was vetoed by Russia, claiming that it was abiding by the obligations set out in the 1967 OST. Moreover during last October’s UN First Committee sitting, China was calling for similar measures, however recently a lack of tangible progress has been made.
For decades, space was the domain of state actors, at some point dominated by Cold War-era rivalries between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the rapid expansion of private sector involvement in space exploration and technology has introduced new challenges. private companies now launching satellites, developing military-grade space technology, and collaborating with defense agencies, the lines between commercial and strategic interests are increasingly blurred. Not only have the foundations of inter-state space dispute resolution become shaky, but non-state actors currently have no legal obligations towards space safety due to the absence of regulatory oversight. Indeed, existing space treaties, such as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, were drafted long before the rise of private space enterprises and are now outdated as they do not adequately address the role of corporations in space militarization. For instance, companies like SpaceX or Blue Origin, have transformed the space industry by making satellite deployment and more accessible and cost-effective. While this commercialization has driven technological advancements, it has also expanded the range of actors capable of influencing global security dynamics. SpaceX, for example, provides satellite-based communication services, such as its Starlink network, which has already played a role in military conflicts, such as in Ukraine, where Starlink has been instrumental in maintaining internet access for both civilians and the military. Moreover, the rapid development of ASAT weapons by both state and non-state actors increases the risk of space conflicts, potentially endangering global communication networks and navigation systems.
The weaponization of space presents multiple risks, ranging from an increased likelihood of conflict to the potential for accidental escalation. Without clear international agreements governing private military activity in space, states may perceive commercial activities as threats. Therefore, academics are calling for the implementation of a global regulatory framework to govern private sector activities in space.
Several steps can be taken to mitigate such risks, for instance by strengthening international treaties to address private sector involvement, creating an independent regulatory body to oversee private space activities or increasing public-private collaboration on security norms to prevent the development of offensive space weapons. The rise of private actors in space is an irreversible trend, but without proactive regulation and international cooperation, the risks of weaponization will only grow. By implementing robust governance mechanisms, the global community can ensure that outer space remains a realm for innovation and peaceful development rather than a new battleground for geopolitical conflict.
Comments