Between Memory and Morality: Germany and Israel’s complicated relationship

As the human rights crisis in Gaza worsened, protests in Germany were rising, fuelled by some citizens believing that the government was not taking enough action. From activists and public figures being uninvited to conferences because of their views, to UN experts accusing the government of systematically suppressing manifestations for Gaza, public opinion grew increasingly divided whilst the government continued to send weapons to Israel. 

Germany’s moral duty to support Israel is grounded in the ‘Staatsräson’ (reason of state). It was first used by former chancellor Angela Merkel in 2008 and reinforced by Olaf Scholz. Whilst not codified in the law, this principle gives an insight into Germany’s strong support for Israel, the State. However, when the suffering of the civilian population in Gaza worsened, Germany faced a dilemma between its support for the State of Israel following the Staatsräson and its adherence to human rights and international law.  

The memory of the Holocaust continues to serve as a moral compass for and key pillar of German Identity. However, this is changing as old generations are passing away, antisemitic attacks rise and there is an increased pragmatism in German foreign policy.  

Israeli - German relations 

Many established authors agree that there is a broad consensus that Germany has a special moral and historic responsibility to protect and support Jewish life and Israel (Langenbacher, 2014;Tkocz & Stritzel, 2025; Bachleitner, 2019; Krell, 2024). However, authors also show that Germany and Israel relate to the memory of the holocaust in very different ways (Berensköter & Mitrani, 2022; Ofer, 2013; De Vita, 2015).  

The prevailing political belief in Israel is that it is determined to never let anyone decide their future again, whilst Germany wants to continue to shape Israel to be a peaceful democracy, showing tensions in the visions (Berensköter & Mitrani, 2022, p. 10).

The countries relate to the memory of the Holocaust in an “Ungleichzeitigkeit” (asynchronism). According to Berensköter & Mitrani (2022), Israel sees the responsibility deriving from the Holocaust as “ever-present”, under the motto of “never again”, whilst Germany connects it to the Present, under “never forget”. This makes it difficult for them to truly evolve into equal partners, even friends, as the foundations of a shared memory are not truly perceived in the same way. Additionally, it contradicts the public rhetoric of politicians from both countries, who describe “the “very strong” (Merkel) and “very, very good” (Netanyahu) friendship that allegedly exists between Germany and Israel (Berensköter & Mitrani, 2022, p. 2).   

German domestic aspects 

This tension is further complicated domestically in Germany, where the feelings of responsibility vary between political affiliation, the former East and West and the government and public opinion (Tkocz & Stritzel, 2025; Krell, 2024). For example, the far-left party Die Linke’s portrays Israel as a colonial oppressor and equates it with Nazi Germany, downplaying its unique horror and the deriving responsibility (Voigt, 2013). This directly contradicts the ‘Staatsräson’ (reason of state). 

Whilst collective memory remains central to both national identities and the government’s political legitimacy (Bachleitner, 2019), demographic shifts, the gradual passing of Holocaust survivors, and the increased diversity of German society challenge the universality of the Holocaust memory (Rothberg, 2014). Moreover, several authors point out a gradual decline of this feeling of responsibility towards Israel (De Vita, 2015; Langenbacher, 2014; Tkocz & Stritzel, 2024). Langenbacher (2014, p. 56) highlights that a ‘new form’ of foreign policy is developing, which is characterized by actors no longer being shy to “insert their interests and exercise power”, a dynamic that directly shapes Germany-Israel relations. Germany’s foreign policy is therefore no longer solely framed by Holocaust memory but also strategic interests. 

The ‘Staatsräson’ (reason of state) and the Gaza crisis 

The concept of the ‘Staatsräson’ (reason of state) is one of the most important self-proclaimed norms in Germany (Berensköter & Mitrani, 2022), however it remains rather vague. When invoked by Merkel in 2008, it meant that Israel’s security would never be negotiable for Germany. However, at the time, this did not mean any obligation for military support (Wiener, 2024). Tkocz & Stritzel (2024) defined it as Germany’s special responsibility to “pay off a historical debt, to compensate victims of the Holocaust and protect the state representing them in exchange for rehabilitation and recognition of Germany as a “good” state. Wiener (2024)  adds that Staatsräson means that the survival of one’s own state is valued above all. The norm’s extent remains elusive today, as there is much uncertainty about its meaning. 

To conclude, Krell (2024) describes how the attack of Hamas on the 7^{th of} October and consequent eruption of a new wave of violence in the Israel-Gaza conflict have become a source of polarization in Germany. Several authors argue that Germany should face the contradiction between its historic responsibilities toward Israel and the deficiencies in Israel’s policies towards Palestinians, which challenges Germany’s adherence to international law (Krell, 2024;). Tkocz & Stritzel (2024) warn that Israel’s autonomy results in Germany’s vulnerability, to the point of the possibility of causing an identity crisis. 

Generally, I agree with both perspectives, that Germany should re-evaluate its responsibilities and speak up more (Krell, 2024), whilst also preserving the holocaust remembrance, especially amidst increasing Antisemitism in Germany and the slow decline of holocaust remembrance.