Autocrats in trouble?: Political turbulence in Southeast Europe

With Trump’s election to power and the arguable decline of the liberal world order, this might be an untimely question to ask. However, while political tension has never been uncommon in Southeast Europe, in the past year it was amplified across the region. Headlines of historic student demonstrations in Serbia, anti-government protests in Slovakia, and traces of political reform in Hungary are all signs of a turbulent political era. The commonality between these countries is not only that they are in the same geographical region, but also that their governments are increasingly turning autocratic. 

The Vucic, Fico and Orban triumvirate, from Serbia, Slovakia and Hungary respectively, are political heavyweights, serving a staggering 42 years in power if you add up their term lengths. Their stranglehold on power has been made possible by their relentless rejection of democratic principles, monopolisation of media, and systematic corruption amongst others. Their source of inspiration is often a page right out of Vladimir Putin’s playbook.

When it comes to silencing opposition media or banning Pride, the Kremlin's recipe is what appeals to them the most. While all three leaders have been incredibly successful in playing the autocrat game, it seems that political turbulence is now forcing them to grip their seats. Or is this simply a misperception? Could the autocrats be in trouble?

Russian connection

When Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán proclaimed his intention to invigorate an ‘illiberal democracy’ in Hungary in 2014, many were scratching their heads as to what that would entail. A decade down the line, it has become obvious that soft Putinism has striking similarities with Orban’s new ideology. The concept of illiberal democracy has since become Hungary’s most important export. Not only has it infiltrated the political systems of surrounding countries, but it has also found admirers across the pond. Orban’s illiberal petri dish has attracted key US conservative ideologists, although so far not much of his policies have yet been implemented. 

But what is the essence of this new postmodern autocracy? If we look at Vucic and Orban, they have both become unquestionable leaders of their respective countries. They have achieved this through the relentless centralisation of a democratic society. Civic society has become a dirty word, and NGOs are new enemies of the state. The main goal of the new autocrats was to create a society where everything and everyone depended on the state, therefore they had to stifle alternative sources of funding.

Akin to Vladimir Putin’s Foreign Agents Law implemented in 2012, Budapest, Belgrade, and Bratislava have pushed for legislations that cripple NGOs, free media, and civil society groups. The irony is that these bills clamour for transparency and ending foreign influence, but the foreign influence only seems to cause issues when it comes from the West. Nevertheless, they have also mobilised significant outrage. 

Despite the EU’s efforts to decouple energy supplies from Russia, these three countries have been happily continuing to strike new deals with Gazprom, the Russian state monopoly. They mostly cite pragmatism or ‘physical geography’ as reasons for the continued demand for Russian gas, however, Fico’s and Vucic’s eagerness to attend the Victory Day Parade on Red Square this May could hardly be explained from a pragmatic standpoint. The Victory Parades are annual demonstrations of Russia’s military strength, celebrating Germany’s capitulation to the USSR in May 1945. Both Fico and Vucic are aware that their visit to Moscow will signify a backstab to the Western alliance, and will play into the hands of Moscow’s autocrat. The phone calls, Viktor Orban’s 14 official visits with Vladimir Putin since 2009, as well as the continuous vetoing of EU proposals to strengthen Ukraine and weaken Russia are all signs that the long arm of Moscow has certainly taken a firm grip on the region’s leaders. What’s more is that recently the Serbian government has announced that Russian intelligence services were openly supporting their Serbian counterparts in ‘dealing with’ the student protests that have been rocking the country since last November. Since then, Vucic has gone further to characterise it as a ‘coloured revolution’, a buzzword often thrown around by Kremlinites to describe popular grassroots protests as foreign-engineered attempts at toppling governments. 

Trouble in paradise

While it might seem that Russian interference is placing Southeast European civil society and resistance in a hopeless position, the foundations of these systems are increasingly brittle. 

In Serbia, the Novi Sad train station disaster in November last year showed the limelight on the rampant corruption of Vucic’s government. The loss of 16 lives due to poor inspection standards prompted historic demonstrations in the country, pushed by students. While at first Serbian media and government communication were antagonising the protesters, the breadth of the coalition behind the cause made President Vucic back down. His dismissal of his prime minister, and proposed concessions to the protestors, displays at least a sign of hope for change in Serbia. But the lack of organised opposition makes the triggering of change hardly possible. Similarly in Slovakia, even though Fico has been facing coalition infighting and sweeping protests, the political landscape seems incredibly fragmented, which is likely to prevent serious change. The bottom line is that if Vucic and Fico remain the guiding stars on the Serbian and Slovakian skies, their predisposition to Russian influence will not weaken. 

The importance of an organised opposition cannot be stressed enough. After Orban’s fourth (!) two-thirds seat win in 2022, political apathy was spreading out across Hungary. It seemed unlikely that the fate of the country would change anytime soon. Orban’s masterful political manoeuvring cemented his power. At least until everything changed; with the clemency scandal in February 2024 and economic downturn shaking the core of Hungarian politics. 

Investigative journalists, the types that Orban would consider enemies of the state, found out that the President of Hungary gave a pardon to a school director who wanted to patch up a case of pedophilia, causing massive outrage. Former Fidesz (Orban’s party) insiders spoke up against the incident and formed a political counterweight to Orban’s party-state. Peter Magyar’s opposition party has since made astronomic strifes in polls and in European and municipal elections alike. His ability to mobilise disenchanted voters that once looked up to Orban’s regime for change shows that even the surest systems can eventually be challenged. Orban’s state machinery however must not be underestimated, and a cornered beast always fights hardest. 

Fateful decisions

To answer whether autocrats are truly in trouble, we must consider that political manoeuvring might save the autocrats from getting the boot. However, it is clear that the magic is wearing off. And the voters are beginning to see and feel the ugly realities behind the facade of populism. It is also crucial to consider that removing the autocrats of Southeast Europe would not merely be a shift in power. It would answer a far deeper civilisational question; does the region want to return to its Western ambitions or remain in the stranglehold of Eastern autocracy, which had brought it so much suffering before. The worry is however that the Moscowite network might not give in so easily. We might see the political tensions amped up even further in the next few years, which certainly poses plenty of concerns.